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BRUNSDEN V. HUMPHREY.
NOTES
BRUNSDEN v. HUMPHREY.'
Do injuries both to the person and property, caused by
one and the same negligent act, constitute but one cause of
action, or is it severable so that a separate action may be
maintained for each trespass ? Probably no question has been
more often discussed or ably argued than has this. Since
the first decision involving this question to the present day
there has been a conflict in opinions.
Nevertheless, there is one principle which is recognized
and followed by the courts of both the United States and Eng-
land; namely, that, "no man ought to be twice vexed if it
appear to the court that it is for one and the same cause of
action." But herein lies the difficulty and variance in de-
cisions. Just what constitutes one cause of action?
In the case of Brunsden v. Humphrey (supra) the question
was thoroughly discussed. The facts of the case, which are
brief, are these: The plaintiff, a cabman, while driving his
vehicle was run into by a cab belonging to the defendant, the
collision being due to the negligence of the defendant's ser-
vant. The plaintiff had before instituted an action upon
which he had recovered for damage to his cab, and then he
brought a subsequent action for personal injuries sustained
in the same accident. The defendant pleaded in bar the
former recovery for damage to the cab. The court, however,
reversed the judgment of the court below, which was in favor
of the defendant, and gave judgment for the plaintiff. This
case was decided on extremely technical and logical grounds.
Three reasons were given for bringing separate suits. First,
it was said that in order to support the action for damage to
the cab, only evidence as to the physical act of destruction
1. L. R., 14 Q. B. D. 712.
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and the amount of actual damage to the vehicle need be given,
while in the action for damage to tfae person of the plaintiff
it would be necessary to offer evidence founded on the state-
ments of medical authorities. Thus the evidence used to
support one cause of action would not be identical with the
evidence needed for the maintainance of the other. Second,
according to the established law of England, the action for
personal injuries was not assignable, while actions for the
damage to property could be assigned. Third, actions for
injuries to the person were barred by the Statute of Limita-
tions unless commenced within three years, while in actions
for damage to property the Statute of Limitations allowed a
period of six years as the maximum amount of time to elapse
before instituting the suit. Although all this is true, yet,
as Lord Coleridge, Ch. J., dissenting from the above decision
said, it is an unnecessary distinction and contrary to justice.
In his able and well written opinion he said, that, if a man
was injured in the arm and the leg, it would be apparent that
only one action could be maintained for damages; yet, if in
addition he sustained damage to his apparel, undoubtedly the
law, as it stands, would allow him to institute a separate suit
for further compensation.
Even text writers agree, to a certain extent, with the de-
cision in Brunsden v. Humphrey (supra), for in a well-known
text upon "Judgments" it is said, "........ Damage to goods
and injuries to the person, although caused by one and the
same wrongful act, are infringements of different rights and
give rise to distinct causes of action; and therefore the recov-
ery of compensation for damage to the goods is no bar to an
action subsequently commenced for the personal injury."22
There are several decisions in the United States support-
ing this theory among which is the case of Smith et al. v.
Warden et al.3 The facts of the case are these: The plaintiff,
2. Black, Judgments, sec. 740.
3. 86 Mo. 382.
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Leonora Smith, lived across the street from the defendant's
place of business. Due to the unsafe condition of a boiler
used by the defendant, it exploded, throwing water, pieces
uf coal, and steel through the door, injuring the plaintiff who
was standing in the doorway, and damaging the furniture and
other personal property in the house. The defendant procured
a signed statement from the plaintiff's husband acknowledg-
ing themselves indebted to him for a certain sum for the
injury to the plaintiff and for the damage done to the personal
property. The plaintiff, however, brought this action for the
personal injuries sustained. The plaintiff had judgment in
the court below and, upon appeal by the defendant, the judg-
went was affirmed. As may be gathered from the following
opinion by the court, the distinction was recognized between
actions for injuries to the person and for injury to property
from the same negligent act of the defendant, for it was
stated, "For these several injuries, two distinct causes of
action arose; one to the husband for the injury to his furni-
ture, etc., and the other to the wife for the injuries to her
person. The receipt of the husband, offered and read in
evidence, was no bar to the cause of action, thus accruing to
the wife, and for which this suit was brought. But its own
terms fairly construed, the receipt of the husband is limited
to the payment of the actual damages to his furniture, to the
payment of the doctor's bill incurred by him by reason thereof,
up to that date, and in further payment of a truss to be pur-
chased by the wife. If there is anything in the latter clause
of the receipt, indicating that the same is to be in full for all
damages done to the person of the wife, then the same to that
extent is without consideration, and besides that, there is no
evidence that the husband had any authority from the wife to
settle or dispose of her right of action, growing out of the
injury so done to her person."
The State of Texas has always maintained that separate
suits should be brought as is shown by the case of Watson v.
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Texas and Pac. Ry. Co.4 The material facts are as folowsfw:
The plaintiff was injured while riding on a train belonging
to the defendant and his stock, which he was accompanying,
was killed by reason of the negligence of the train crew. The
plaintiff had recovered for the value of the horses and then
brought a separate suit for personal injuries, and the court
held that the suit was rightly instituted and, further, that the
former recovery was no bar to the second action.
Connecticut formerly followed the law in England as is
shown by the case of Boerum v. Taylor.5  The declaration in
this case contained two counts; one in trespass for placing in
a jug of rum certain noxious ingredients whereby the liquor
was rendered valueless; and the other in case, for putting
the same substance in the same jug with the intent that the
plaintiff should drink thereof; and that the plaintiff drank
the mixture, causing sickness and the inpairment of his
health. It was held by the court that these counts were essen-
tially different, and could not be joined. Church, Ch. J.,
stated, "The act complained of, to be sure, is the same as
described in both counts; but it resulted in very different
consequences, constituting, in their nature, very dissimilar
causes of action; an injury to the property, as the direct re-
sult, and an injury to the health of the plaintiff, as its indirect
and more remote consequence. A recovery for one of these
injuries would have been no bar against a recovery for the
other, in a separate action. The evidence which would sustain
the first count would fall short of sustaining the second; and
this is said to be the test of determining whether causes of
action are the same." But this case cannot be taken as a
statement of the law in Connecticut today, for it was ex-
pressly overruled by the case of Seger v. The Town of Bark-
hamstedo wherein the decision was founded upon the "com-
mon-sense" rule as stated by Lord Coleridge, Ch. J., in his
dissenting opinion in Brunsden v. Humphrey (supra).
4. 27 S. W. 924,
5. 19 Conn. 122.
6. 22 Conn. 290.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol8/iss1/3
UIMZSDE1 V. H'UMPHMREY.
In the State of New York the decisions are conflicting and
irregular, although the Court of Appeals in the case of Reilly
v. Sicilian Asphalt Paving Company7 strongly upheld the
English rule.
In Missouri, Massachusetts, and Minnesota, the doctrine
has never been declared to be the law, and there is a long line
of decisions to that effect." This is very ably shown by the
case of Dillard v. St. L. and N. R. R. Co.' In this case the
plaintiff alleged that he was the owner of a horse and certain
harness, and that the defendant negligently ran its train of
cars on and over the horse, killing it, and thus damaging him
to the amount of one hundred and fifty dollars. He further
alleged that the harness upon the horse was damaged to the
amount of fifty dollars. In the Justice of the Peace court, the
plaintiff obtained a verdid for one hundred and seventy-five
dollars, and upon appeal to the Circuit Court, one hundred
and seventy dollars damages. The defendant then appealed
to the Supreme Court. The defendant's contention was that
the Justice of the Peace court did not have jurisdiction of
the said cause of action due to a statute (Wagn. Sat., 808),
which provided that "justices of the peace and the circuit
courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction in all actions against
any railroad company in this State, to recover damages for
the killing, crippling, or injuring of horses, mules, cattle, or
other animals within their respective townships, without re-
gard to their value, or the amount of damages claimed for
killing or injuring the same." The court, in sustaining the
defendant's contention, and in reversing the judgment of the
court below, stated, " ...... The action was brought to recover
for a single injury. By one single act, two classes of property
were injured, but the cause of action accruing to the plaintiff,
by which they would recover for the entire injury, constituted
7. 170 N. Y., 40.
8. J. L. Coy Y. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co., 186 Mo. App. 408;
Von Fragstein v. Windler, 2 Mo. App. 598.
9. 58 Mo. 355.
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but one single cause of action which cannot be severed in
order to give the justice jurisdiction to try the cause."
As to the splitting of causes of action where the action is
upon a contractual obligation and a former recovery has been
had in trover for the same goods which are now sued for in
assumpsit, the deviation from the established rule is hardly
negligible in the different States. This is well illustrated by
the case of Union Ry. Co. i. Traube. 10 This was an action by
the transportation company to recover four hundred and
eleven dollars freight bill on a shipment of rice from New
York to St. Louis. The answer set up a counterclaim for one
thousand dollars damages for failing to deliver fifty-eight
tierces of rice, a portion of a cargo ordered by the defendant.
The reply admitted the failure to deliver the fifty-eight tierces
of rice, but set up a judgment recovered by Traube in Circuit
Court of the United States against the plaintiff for two
thousand, six hundred and sixteen dollars, the value of the
rice, and further claimed the judgment which was paid was
an adjudication of that matter which barred the defendant
from setting up his counterclaim. The court, in rendering
judgment for the plaintiff, stated, "The plea of former recov-
ery is very equitably and liberally construed by the courts,
and if the subject-matter of the two suits is different, and the
same question was not in fact litigated, and no evidence
offered concerning it, the courts are disposed to allow the
merits of the case to be investigated in the second suit. But
there must, in consideration of public policy as well as settled
law, be an end to litigation. The -question is, whether the
same cause of action has once been litigated and decided. If
it has, there is an end to it, and ought to be, and it is the
business of the party who brings the second action to show
that the cause of action is immaterial, and if the cause be the
same the judgment is conclusive, and therefore, a judgment
in trover is a bar to an action of assumpsit for the same
10. 59 Mo. 355.
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goods." This opinion states the prevailing law in the State
of Missouri and is supported by a number of decisions."'
In certain cases, ignorance of existing damages may be-
come the basis for bringing a second suit. This rule, however,
is limited to actions for damages to property and in no case
is the plaintiff allowed to bring a second suit for injuries to his
person of which he was unaware at the time of the first suit,
for he is bound to recover compensation, if at all, for his
prospective or future damages in his first action. The prin-
ciple upon which this rests is ably stated in the case of
Moran v. Plankington,' 2 wherein the following rule was stated
by the court: "........... A party should not be precluded in
consequence of a former action, if such action were brought in
unavoidable ignorance of the full extent of the wrongs re-
ceived or injuries done. Any other ccdnclusion would be
reached only through sanctioning the rankest injustice."
Gill, J., in delivering the opinion of the court in the ease of
Steiglider v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 13 probably gives the best
reason for disallowing the splitting of causes of action. The
sensibility of his argument is shown by the following extract
from the opinion of the court: "The books present a variety
of decisions on the general question here suggested, which,
although at times apparently inharmonious, yet agree on the
principle, fundamental in all such controversies, 'that one
shall not be twice vexed for one and the same cause,' that
there shall be but one suit for one cause of action. The policy
of the rule is manifest. It protects the defendant from a
multiplication of suits by a vexatious litigant, and avoids ob-
structing the courts with a cloud of petty cases supported by
the same facts, and involving the same legal questions. The
plaintiff must bring his whole complaint into court in one
11. Howard v. Clarke, et aL, 43 Mo. 347; Wagner v. Jacoby, 26 Mo. 532;
Wheeler Savings Bank v. Tracy, et al., 141 Mo. 252.
12. 64 Mo. 337. See also Morgan v. San Fran. Ry. Co., 111 Mo. App. 721.
13. 38 Mo. App. 511.
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suit at one time,-that the cause of action then existing may
be entirely considered and forever settled, that there may be
an end to litigation. It is not meant by this rule that the
plaintiff must join in one action every demand, which, under
the rules of law, he might join, but it is only meant that,
where he has but one cause of action, he shall have but one
chance to litigate. He cannot, in an action for a wrong com-
mitted by the defendant, sue for, and recover, a portion of the
damages resulting therefrom, and, then, at some future time,
be permitted to complain of the same wrong, and recover
other items of damage existing and known to such plaintiff
at the institution of the former action."
It is apparent that the grounds upon which these decisions
rest is injustice; injustice in accumulating unnecessary suits;
injustice in burdening the courts with a multiplicity of suits;
and, injustice to the Republic as a whole in delaying litigation
of others.
M. J.D.
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